

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3090

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 5930

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-79

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: ATLANTIC RELATIONS: NAC DISCUSSION DECEMBER 5

DEPARTMENT CIRCULATE TO OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED

REF: STATE 236115 (EXDIS)

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS REPORT OF NAC DISCUSSION ON ATLANTIC
RELATIONS DECEMBER 5. HIGHLIGHTS SENT SEPTTEL.
END SUMMARY.

1. UNITED STATES DELEGATION CIRCULATED TEXT OF U.S. REVISIONS
CONTAINED STATE 236115 TO PERMREPS ON DECEMBER 5 PRIOR TO COUNCIL
DEBATE WHICH OPENED AT 10:30 A.M.

2. RUMSFELD OPENED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ON ATLANTIC
RELATIONS IN NAC DECEMBER 5 BY NOTING THAT IN ITS INVITATION
TO WRITE ON ATLANTIC DECLARATION, WHICH CAME WITH THE SECRETARY'S
ADDRESS OF APRIL 23, THE UNITED STATES HAD SUGGESTED A DOCUMENT
THAT WOULD SERVE AS A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE WHILE
RECOGNIZING THE CHANGES OF THE PAST. HE NOTED THAT THE U.S.
LOOKED FORWARD TO A DOCUMENT THAT RECOGNIZED THE IMPACT OF
DETENTE BOTH IN ITS REAL MEANING AND IN THE PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS
ABOUT THE NEED FOR CONTINUED DEFENSE. HE NOTED U.S. BELIEFS THAT
THE DECLARATION SHOULD ADDRESS ITSELF TO THOSE GENERATIONS BORN
AFTER WW II AND SEEK TO REPLACE FEARS WITH ASPIRATIONS AS THE
BASIS FOR OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORT. RUMSFELD NOTED THAT U.S. HAD
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BEEN GUIDED BY ABOVE OBJECTIVES IN DISCUSSING SEVERAL TEXTS PRO-
DUCED TO DATE. IN INTRODUCING SPECIFIC WASHINGTON REACTIONS TO
THE CURRENT FRENCH DRAFT, RUMSFELD NOTED THAT CHANGES PROPOSED
REFLECTED U.S. VIEW THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE FACES COMMON

CHALLENGES AND DANGERS TO WHICH COMMON RESPONSES MUST BE JOINTLY FORMULATED. IDENTIFYING PARAGRAPHS 3 THROUGH 6 AS KEY ELEMENTS IN DECLARATION, RUMSFELD SUGGESTED US PROPOSALS HAD BEEN DRAFTED TO DEMONSTRATE A GREATER SENSE OF COMMONALITY AND TO MEET CONCERNS BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT A NORTH AMERICA-VS-EUROPE APPROACH MIGHT IMPINGE ADVERSELY ON THE PUBLIC'S CONCEPT OF THE INDIVISIBILITY WHICH HAS GOVERNED THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 15 ALLIANCE MEMBERS THROUGHOUT THE LAST QUARTER CENTURY.

3. WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC CHANGES, THE UNITED STATES HAS SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 3, RUMSFELD NOTED THAT OUR PRINCIPAL PURPOSE WAS TO REMOVE THE EMPHASIS ON A DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE THREAT POSED TO THE U.S. AND TO THE OTHER ALLIES. MOREOVER, WHILE THE U.S. HAS RETAINED A STATEMENT CONCERNING CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, THE UNITED STATES ALSO BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT THAT THE TEXT REFLECT THE CENTRAL IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC PARITY, NAMELY THAT THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR ATTACK AS AN ASPECT OF OVERALL DEFENSE IS INCREASINGLY COMPLEX. RUMSFELD EXPLAINED THAT THIS LANGUAGE CHANGE REGISTERS IN A LOGICAL PLACE IN THE TEXT THE ESSENTIAL RATIONALE FOR THE ENSUING STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 CONCERNING THE ESSENTIALITY OF U.S. AND EUROPEAN FORCES CONTRIBUTIONS. FURTHERMORE, THE U.S. HAS USED THE PHRASE "DEFENSE OF EUROPE" IN PLACE OF "EUROPEAN DEFENSE" TO ELIMINATE ANY IMPLICATION THAT NORTH AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE DO NOT HAVE IMPORTANT ROLES TO PLAY. FINALLY, THE LAST SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 3 RESTATES THE COMMITMENT THAT ALL OF THE ALLIES MADE UNDER ARTICLE V OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. OUR CHANGES EMPHASIZE THAT THE NORTH AMERICAN ALLIES HAVE PLEDGED THEMSELVES TO STAND WITH THE ALLIES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE ENTIRE TREATY AREA AND THUS NO AREA OR NATION STANDS ALONE.

4. RUMSFELD SAID THAT THE ELIMINATION OF THE FIRST SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 4 WAS BASED IN PART ON EDITORIAL CONSIDERATIONS; BUT IT ALSO DERIVES FROM OUR VIEW THAT A STATEMENT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO BASIC CHANGE RESULTING FROM THE NEW STRATEGIC SITUATION WOULD NOT BE LOGICALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PROPOSED REVISION OF PARAGRAPH 3 AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE ASSERTION IN THAT PARAGRAPH OF THE
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INCREASING
COMPLEXITY OF THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR ATTACK AND FOLLOWING STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE NEED TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE SECURITY.

5. RUMSFELD NOTED THAT AS HE HAD REMARKED ON MONDAY, THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE THE PHRASE IN PARAGRAPH 5 TO READ "THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS, WHO PROVIDE THREE-QUARTERS OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE FORCES IN EUROPE," TO CITE THE 90 PER CENT FIGURE WHICH MORE ACCURATELY DESCRIBES THE MANPOSER RATIO. IN RESPONSE TO UK PERMREP PECK'S STATEMENT ON DECEMBER 3 THAT USE OF THIS RATIO MIGHT DISTORT THE REAL PICTURE OF THE BALANCE, RUMSFELD CITED

THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF MEMORANDUM ON STATISTICAL DATA REFLECTING 3,285,100 EUROPEAN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND 309,000 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN EUROPE. THESE STATISTICS BEAR OUT THE 90-10 RATIO WHICH MOREOVER REFLECTS STATEMENTS THE UNITED STATES HAD PUBLICLY USED AT HOME IN DEFENDING RETENTION OF THE CURRENT LEVEL OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE. RUMSFELD SAID THE U.S. HAD ALSO SUGGESTED DELETION OF THE FINAL SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 5 SINCE WE THOUGHT IT PREFERABLE TO HAVE A GENERALIZED STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE ALLIED AIM TO PREVENT WAS IN ALL ITS FORMS AND NOT TO LAY DOWN RULES AND LIMITS UNDER WHICH WAR WOULD BE WAGED. IN THIS INTERPRETATION, AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD REFERRED PERMREPS TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S STATEMENT ON THIS POINT AT SAN CLEMENTE.

6. RUMSFELD POINTED OUT THAT OUR SUGGESTED, NEW FINAL SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 6 CORRESPONDS TO OUR DESIRE TO BALANCE THE STATEMENT ELSEWHERE IN THAT PARAGRAPH CONCERNING THE ALLIES' READINESS TO EMPLOY FORCES, IF NECESSARY, WITH THE STATEMENT OF THE ALLIES' AIM OF PREVENTING WAR. RUMSFELD NOTED THAT THIS ALSO RELATES TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE REFERENCE TO THE U.S.-USSR AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR IN PARAGRAPH 5.

7. CANADIAN CHARGE MARSHALL LED OFF RESPONSE TO U.S. PRESENTATION TERMING IT AN IMPORTANT "MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENT" WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS VERY WELCOME AND WHICH WENT "A VERY LONG WAY" TOWARD MEETING CANADIAN CONCERNS ABOUT ARTICLE 3.

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8. FRENCH PERMREP DE ROSE SAID HIS FEW "REFLECTIONS" WERE ON PURELY PERSONAL BASIS ONLY, AFTER ONE HOUR OF STUDY OF THE U.S. TEXT WHICH HE SAID WAS BEING LOOKED AT FURTHER WITH AVID INTEREST. WHILE RESERVING PARIS' RIGHT TO FURTHER COMMENT, DE ROSE SAID THAT HE "WAS NOT IN THE DARK ON PARIS' VIEWS" AND FELT THAT MANY OF HIS PERSONAL STATEMENTS WOULD RECEIVE THE BACKING OF HIS AUTHORITIES. IN SPECIFIC COMMENT, DE ROSE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE BROAD MARGIN OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AND FRENCH TEXTS AS EVIDENCED BY APPARENT AGREEMENT WITH ALL BUT FOUR OF THE 12 DRAFT PARAGRAPHS. DE ROSE

IDENTIFIED PARAGRAPH 3 AS PROVIDING THE KEY TO THE CURRENT TEXT. RE SENTENCE 1 OF PARAGRAPH 3, DE ROSE REPEATED THAT FRANCE WAS ONLY STATING THE OBVIOUS IN DESCRIBING DIFFERENCES OF VULNERABILITY BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPE. BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT VULNERABILITIES RESULTING FROM THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, EUROPE, IS, UNLIKE NORTH AMERICA VULNERABLE TO NUCLEAR AND ALL OTHER KINDS OF ATTACK INCLUDING POLITICAL PRESSURE. REGARDING U.S. CHANGES IN SENTENCE 2, DE ROSE SAID THE "DEFENSE OF EUROPE" LANGUAGE SOUGHT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTED A TRANSLATION PROBLEM ONLY SINCE THE FRENCH TEXT HAD READ "DEFENSE OF EUROPE" THROUGHOUT. FRENCH PERMREP CHALLENGED U.S. DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AS "INCREASINGLY COMPLEX" AND PREFERRED FRENCH USE OF "SPECIFIC." DE ROSE FELT INTRODUCTION OF "COMPLEXITY" CONCEPT MIGHT PROMPT DANGEROUS ASSUMPTION THAT PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE ARE SO COMPLEX THAT ALLIANCE IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO SOLVE THEM. HE SAID ALLIANCE DEFENSE PROBLEMS HAD ALWAYS BEEN BASED ON A CHANGING SITUATION BUT BASIC NATO STRATEGY HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO PREVENT BY WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY A GROUND SECRET

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ATTACK AGAINST THE ALLIANCE THAT WOULD GIVE AN ADVERSARY A POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. DE ROSE NOTED THAT IN HIS SAN CLEMENTE MEETING WITH PERMREPS, SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHERE THE SOVIETS TO AMASS 15 DIVISIONS AT ANY-ONE POINT. HE SAID THIS RESPONSE WAS A SPECIFIC NOT A COMPLEX THING. COMPLEXITY MIGHT GIVE AN IMPRESSION OF CONFUSION AND IMPOTENCY. DE ROSE QUESTIONED WISDOM OF INSERTING U.S. PARAGRAPH 3'S SENTENCE 3 DEFINING IT AS "CATECHISM" WHICH DID NOT NEED REPETITION. DE ROSE ALSO QUESTIONED LANGUAGE ON "CHOOSING TO STATION ARMED FORCES" SINCE SOME MIGHT FEEL THAT ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY COMES ONLY UPON STATIONING OF FORCES ABROAD AND NOT FROM OTHER MOTIVATIONS AND BONDS. DE ROSE NOTED THAT FRANCE HAD NOT HAD FORCES IN THE U.S. DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS BUT HAD EXPRESSED SOLIDARITY WITH ITS ALLY NONETHELESS. RE PARAGRAPH 4, DE ROSE THOUGHT PROBLEM WITH SENTENCE 1 WAS ONLY ONE OF TRANSLATION, PERHAPS ALREADY TAKEN CARE OF BY A NEW INTERNATIONAL STAFF TRANSLATION OF THE CURRENT TEXT (SENT SEPTTEL) WHICH READS "THIS NEW SITUATION IN NO WAY ALTERS THE ESSENTIAL FACT." HE NOTED THAT THE FRENCH TEXT ASSERTS THAT CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE DO NOT MODIFY IN ANY WAY THE IDEA THAT THERE IS NO REPLACEMENT FOR U.S. AND CANADIAN FORCES. DE ROSE DEFENDED THE "AT PRESENT" LANGUAGE TERMING IT AS MERELY A FACTUAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. RE PARAGRAPH 5, DE ROSE IDENTIFIED MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM (WHETHER 90-10 OR 75-25 EUROPEAN-U.S. FORCE RATIO) AS PURELY SECONDARY BUT SAID HE WAS PREOCCUPIED AT U.S. PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE REFERENCE TO THE U.S SOVIET AGREEMENT OF JUNE 22, 1973. DE ROSE NOTED SECRETARY KISSINGER'S RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION AT SAN CLEMENTE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT LEFT THE RUSSIANS IN ANY DOUBT THAT THE U.S. WAS IN ANY WAY ENGAGED IN AN ATTEMPT TO LAY DOWN RULES AND LIMITS FOR WAGING WAR. HE ALSO WONDERED IF PLACING THE LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 5 ON "LIMITING WAR" IN PARAGRAPH 6 WOULD CONVEY THE SAME MEANING IN

THAT LOCATION WHICH WOULD THEN PLACE IT "IN THE MOUTH OF ALL THE ALLIES." DE ROSE CLOSED HIS REMARKS WITH A PERSONAL OBSERVATION BY NOTING A PERSONAL CITATION TO HIM FROM THE SECRETARY IN HIS BOOK THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP. THE SECRETARY'S CITATION READ: "DEAR FRANCOIS, I KNOW WHEN YOU READ THIS BOOK YOU MAY THINK I HAVE LEARNED MY LESSON TOO WELL."

9. NETHERLANDS. SPIERENBURG WELCOMED THE NEW U.S. AMENDMENTS AND DE ROSE'S THOUGHTFUL COMMENTS. HE SAID HE COULD
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ACCEPT THE U.S. AMENDMENTS ON HIS PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. HE AGREED WITH DE ROSE, HOWEVER, THAT ONE MUST ADMIT THAT THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE DOES HAVE A SPECIFIC CHARACTER. IT IS A FACT THAT AN ATTACK ON NORTH AMERICA WOULD NOT BE THE SAME AS AN ATTACK ON EUROPE.

10. ON THE OTHER HAND, SPIERENBURG BELIEVED THAT THE FRENCH DRAFT GAVE TOO MUCH EMPHASIS TO U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND NOT ENOUGH TO AMERICAN GROUND FORCES, WHICH SPIERENBURG BELIEVED SHOULD BE MENTIONED IN PARA 4. CONCERNING THE ROLE OF UK AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES, HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE "FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE" EITHER FOR THESE FORCES TO PROVIDE THE SAME NUCLEAR GUARANTEE AS DID THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA OR FOR WESTERN EUROPE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY SACRIFICES ---INVOLVING A VERY SHARP JUMP IN DEFENSE BUDGETS-- TO BRING ABOUT SUCH AN INDEPENDENT CAPABILITY. IN THE FACE OF THIS REALITY, HE WAS "ASTONISHED" TO HEAR MORE AND MORE SPECULATION AMONG EUROPEANS THAT EUROPE CAN DEVELOP ITS OWN IDENTITY WITHOUT THE U.S. OR EVEN AGAINST THE U.S.

11. HE THEN POSED A "DELICATE" QUESTION TO DE ROSE. IN CONNECTION WITH STATEMENT IN PARA 5 THAT FRANCE AND UK WERE CAPABLE OF PLAYING A DETERRENT ROLE " OF THEIR OWN," SPIERENBURG ASKED IF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE WAS IN THE ALLIANCE OR OUTSIDE OF IT. HE SAID THAT THE HAGUE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS SENTENCE, WHICH WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY DUTCH PUBLIC OPINION. THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ENDORSE ANY ROLE FOR FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE. HE QUOTED RECENT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADDRESS BY FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT, IN WHICH JOBERT MADE REFERENCE TO THE "GLOBAL" ROLE OF FRENCH FORCES AND THEIR "CONTRIBUTION" TO THE ALLIANCE, AS INDICATING THAT FRANCE DID NOT PERCEIVE HER NUCLEAR FORCES AS BEING ENTIRELY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. SPIERENBURG NOTED THAT VAN DER STOEL WOULD BE MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER AT THE END OF THE WEEK ON THIS QUESTION, AND HE ASKED DE ROSE TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION OF THE FRENCH POSITION TO CONVEY TO VAN DER STOEL. SPIERENBURG ADDED THAT, AT THE END OF HIS LONG DIPLOMATIC CAREER, HE DID NOT WANT TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING ABOUT A DECLARATION OF THE FOURTEEN INSTEAD OF THE FIFTEEN AND PROMISED THAT HE WOULD TRY TO CONVINCE THE HAGUE OF THE NEED TO FIND SOME COMPROMISE FORMULATION,

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HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT THIS SENTENCE
IN PARA 5 AS WRITTEN.

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12. BELGIUM. DE STAERCKE CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION
AS INDISPENSABLE. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THESE AMENDMENTS, WHICH
WOULD AT LAST LEAD TO PROFOUND SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION IN THE
ALLIANCE. DE STAERCKE BELIEVED THAT U.S. AND FRENCH DIFFEERENCES
IN PARA 3 ON "SPECIFIC" AND "COMPLEX" WERE NOT DEEP, AND HE
THOUGHT THAT BOTH IDEAS COULD BE EXPRESSED, I.E., BY SAYING
THAT "THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR ATTACK
TAKES ON AN INCREASINGLY SPECIFIC AND COMPLEX CHARACTER..."

13. IN THE NEXT SENTENCE, DE STAERCKE DISAGREED WITH THE
USE OF THE TERM "CHOOSING," WHICH SOUNDS AS IF THE DECISION
TO STATION FORCES IN THE TERRITORY OF ALLIES IS AN ARBITRARY
ONE AND ONE WHICH COULD EASILY BE CHANGED, WHICH MIGHT HAVE
AN UNDESIRE EFFECT ON PARLIAMENTS. RE FINAL SENTENCE
IN PARA 3, DE STAERCKE ALSO TOOK EXCEPTION TO THE IMPLICATION
THAT COLLECTIVE DEFENSE APPLIED TO "INDIVIDUAL" MEMBER COUNTRIES
AND NOT TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

14. DE STAERCKE ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH SPIERENBURG'S QUESTION
TO DE ROSE CONCERNING THE ROLE OF FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES. HE
ALSO AGREED WITH U.S. PROPOSAL TO DELETE SPECIFID REFERENCES
TO JUNE 22 AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AND ONLY
IDENTIFY ALLIED UNDERSTANDING OF THAT AGREEMENT AT END OF
PARA 6.

15. U.S. RUMSFELD SAID HE SAW U.S. AMENDMENTS AS
A CONTRIBUTION TO A USEFUL DISCUSSION AIMED AT UNDERSTANDING
EACH OTHER'S VIEWS ON MOST IMPORTANT MATTERS. IS THIS NOT WHAT
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ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS ARE ALL ABOUT? HE CONSIDERED COUNCIL DISCUSSION AS USEFUL IN PUTTING BEFORE MINISTERS SUBJECTS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE.

16. IN RESPONDING TO DE ROSE, RUMSFELD SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO INCLUDE CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE DECLARATION: FIRST THEIR VALIDITY AND SECOND THEIR UTILITY VIS-A-VIS PUBLIC OPINION. HE FOUND DE ROSE'S COMMENTS INTERESTING AND AGREED WITH DE ROSE'S REMARK THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE BROAD AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AND FRANCE ON THE DECLARATION AS A WHOLE, BUT HE TOOK EXCEPTION TO DE ROSE'S ASSERTION THAT ALLIES SHOULD NOT MENTION THE OBVIOUS IN LAST SENDTENC PARA 3. SOMETIMES IT IS GOOD TO ADDRESS THE OBVIOUS AND NOT TO DELETE SOMETHING SIMPLY BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SAID. IN CONNEC-TION WITH PARA 3, U.S. HAD ELIMINATED TERM "GREAT STABILITY" SINCE IT APPEARED TO INDICATED THAT STABILITY ENJOYED ONLY BY U.S. AND NOT BY ALLIES. ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE SHARE AS PARTNERS IN THE TREATY AREA, AND IT WAS NOT USEFUL IN PUBLIC OPINION TERMS TO EMPHASIZE SOME DISTINCTIONS. IN ADDITION, WE SHOULD EXAMINE MEANINGS OF TERMS SUCH AS "SPECIFIC" AND "COMPLEX" AS SEEN BY EACH ALLY IN THAT THEY MAY HAVE THEIR OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THESE TERMS. IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT PUBLIC OPINION UNDER- STAND WHAT THE WORDS WE USE MEAN.

17. RE PARA 4, RUMSFELD NOTED THAT U.S. AMENDMENT HAD BEEN DRAFTED TO IMPROVE EARLIER VERSION AND NOT LATEST IS TRANS- LATION. IN CONNECTION WITH SPIERENBURG'S QUESTION TO DE ROSE, RUMSFELD UNDERLINED THE USE OF THE TERM "DETERRENT ROLE."

18. DE ROSE THEN RESPONDED TO SPIERENBURG ON A PERSONAL BASIS. HE WAS PLEASED THAT RUMSFELD HAD HIGHLIGHTED TERM "DETERRENT ROLE" AND HAD NOT QUESTIONED PHRASE "ROLE OF THEIR OWN." HE WAS AWARE THAT IN SALT, THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO LUMP FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES WITH U.S. FORCES, AND IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT ALLIES AVOID ANY LANGUAGE IN DECLARATION WHICH WOULD PLAY INTO SEMENOV'S HANDS. DE ROSE ARGUED THAT MEANINING OF PHRASE "DETERRENT ROLE OF THEIR OWN" DID NOT MEAN A ROLE OUTSIDE OF ALLIANCE. FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES, WHICH HAVE SEPARATE CAPABILITIES AND SEPARATE CONTROL SYSTEMS, ADD SOMETHING TO THE ALLIANCE. THEY CREATE ADDITIONAL FACTORS AND POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH AN ADVERSARY MUST TAKE
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INTO ACCOUNT IN HIS CALCULATIONS.

19. DE ROSE ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE DUTCH POSITION AND BELIEVED THAT HE AND SPIERENBURG WERE NOT AS FAR APART AS THE WORDS IN THE TEXT SEEMED TO INDICATE. DE ROSE SAID HE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PRODUCE SOME SLIGHT REFORMULATIONS,

AT NEXT NAC MEETING WHICH WOULD SAY THE SAME THING, PERHAPS IN A MORE ACCEPTABLE WAY.

20. FRG. DRAPF WAS THANKFUL TO U.S. AND FRANCE FOR FRUITFUL DISCUSSION. WITH RESPECT TO RUMSFELD'S OBSERVATIONS ON IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION, KRAPF FOUND U.S. AMENDMENT TO PARA 3 TOO WORDY AND TOO MUCH LIKE TREATY LANGUAGE, WITH THE SENTENCES TOO LONG. FRENCH TEXT WAS EASIER TO UNDERSTAND, AND ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER DRAFTING PARAGRAPH IN SHORTER SENTENCES. HE AGREED WITH DE STAERCKE THAT TERMS "COMPLEX" AND "CHOOSING" INTRODUCED ELEMENTS OF DOUBT. DRAPF AGREED WITH U.S. SUGGESTION NOT TO MENTION JUNE 22 AGREEMENT.

21. NORWAY. BUSCH BELIEVED THAT U.S. AMENDMENTS POINTED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. HE JOINED THOSE OPPOSING USE OF "CHOOSING" IN PARA 3 AND ALSO HOPED THAT DECLARATION WOULD GIVE DUE WEIGHT TO U.S. CONVENTIONAL FORCES, PERHAPS THROUGH SAYING "NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL" IN PARA 4 OR THROUGH DROPPING "NUCLEAR" ALTOGETHER. ON QUESTION OF UK AND FRENCH FORCES, ALLIES MIGHT ADD "IN THE ALLIANCE" AFTER THE PHRASE "ROLE OF THEIR OWN." KRAPF ADDED SUGGESTION HERE THAT ENTIRE PHRASE "CAPABLE OF PLAYING A DETERRENT ROLE OF THEIR OWN" BE DROPPED.

22. TURKEY. ERALP SHARED SPIERENBURG'S CONCERNS ON FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES, AND WISHED TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION OF AN INDEPENDENT CAPABILITY. HE BELIEVED THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE ADEQUATELY COVERED LATER IN DECLARATION AND WISHED TO PRESERVE PARA 4 AS THE "NUCLEAR UMBRELLA" PARAGRAPH. HE ALSO OPPOSED USE OF TERM "COMPLEX", WHICH CARRIES IMPLICATION THAT THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH THE ALLIES ARE GOING TO HAVE TO LOOK INTO FURTHER.

23 PORTUGAL. NOGUERA MADE A PITCH AGAINST PARA 11. HE DID NOT SEE THE NEED TO REITERATE THESE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE ALREADY ADEQUATELY COVERED IN THE PREAMBLE AND ARTICLE 2
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OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. SPIERENBERG, DESTAERCKE AND LUNS MADE COMMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LEAVE THE PARAGRAPH AS IS AND AVOID A BOTTOMLESS DEBATE ON THESE QUESTIONS.

24. COMMENT: IT BECAME CLEAR IN DISCUSSION THAT DIFFICULTY WITH TERM "FREELY CHOOSING" IN PARA 3 MIGHT BE RESOLVED THROUGH CHANGING TENSE TO "HAVING FREELY CHOSEN." RUMSFELD MADE THIS SUGGESTION DURING DISCUSSION AND IT SEEMED TO MEET NO OBJECTION. ANOTHER IMPROVEMENT WOULD BE TO CHANGE THE SECOND "CHOOSING" IN SENTENCE TO "AGREEING."
RUMSFELD

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